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The Multiple Regulator Model: A Case of Too Many Cooks?

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  • Perai Nur Azam Anuarul

    (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK)

Abstract

Regulation protects the third sector from mismanagement, provides data for policy development, and increases public trust and confidence in its organisations. Different agencies regulate Malaysian third sector organisations (TSO), based on their legal forms and varying activities or functions. Yet, can different regulations governing organisations with similar objectives effectively address issues affecting the sector as a whole? This study provides an overview of the Malaysian third sector regulatory landscape and examines the operational challenges caused by the multiple regulator environment. Third sector actors and regulators were interviewed to understand how they navigate legal and regulatory requirements. Findings show that regulation is hampered by discrepancies surrounding the interpretation and application of laws. This Malaysian study shows that regulatory inconsistencies affect the sector’s operational efficiency and diminish trust between the TSOs and regulators. Based on these findings, uniformity in regulation is crucial to build trust in the sector, as well as between actors and regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • Perai Nur Azam Anuarul, 2021. "The Multiple Regulator Model: A Case of Too Many Cooks?," Nonprofit Policy Forum, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 443-464, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:nonpfo:v:12:y:2021:i:3:p:443-464:n:6
    DOI: 10.1515/npf-2020-0026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
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