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Quality of Justice as an Institutional Game. Insights from the Italian Case

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  • Piana Daniela

    (University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy)

Abstract

Introduction: Is soft power effective? Justice institutions have become a key topic in the international scientific and institutional agendas some decades ago, for different, and still interdependent reasons: the waves of democratizations (Pridham 2000), the increasing power of the judicial branch (Russell and O Brian 2001; Stone Sweet 2002), the transnationalisation of the processes of law making and law enforcement (Allard and Garapon 2005), the increasing demand for justice, dispute resolution, and rights enforcement (Epp 1998; OECD 2014, 2015). Despite the vast literature focusing on these phenomena, very little has been said on the impact that the recent development of the quality of justice mainstream (Fabri et al. 2005; Piana 2010) has on the relationship between the judicial and the executive branch. Notoriously, this relationship is one of the key dimensions for a constitutional democracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Piana Daniela, 2016. "Quality of Justice as an Institutional Game. Insights from the Italian Case," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 22(2), pages 165-189, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:22:y:2016:i:2:p:165-189:n:3
    DOI: 10.1515/jeeh-2016-0002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2007. "Explaining de facto judicial independence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 269-290, September.
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