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Deregulation vs. Re-regulation

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  • Schwarz Jiri

    (Liberalni Institut, Prague)

Abstract

The classical liberal approach to deregulation is based on the consecutive elimination of state regulatory activities and their substitution by competitive market structure. Increasing competition accompanied with decreasing arbitrary state agencies' interventions will undoubtedly cultivate the behaviour of market agents and bring benefits to consumers.The classical liberal approach to deregulation is incompatible with the EU deregulation model, which in case of network industries is still based on the permanent existence of regulatory agencies, Third-Party-Access, public service liability, centralized control of investments and the negative reciprocity. The adoption of these principals will at least delay deregulation process in transition economies but will likely preserve the cartel structure on the utility markets.Economics of regulation and implicitly economics of deregulation is a product of the Chicago School of Economics. Since current "deregulation process" leads to tighter regulation, the adequate term for it should be the reregulation.L'approche libérale classique de la réglementation repose sur l'élimination de la réglementation étatique et leur substitution par des structures marchandes concurrentielles. Une concurrence accrue et une diminution des interventions arbitraires de l'état ne pourront que modifier le comportement des agents sur le marché et engendrer des bénéfices pour les consommateurs.L'approche de la déréglementation du libéralisme classique est incompatible avec le modèle de déréglementation de l'Union Européenne : dans le cas des industries en réseau, ce dernier demeure fondé sur l'existence continue d'agences de réglementation, la responsabilité du service public, le contrôle centralisé des investissements et la réciprocité négative. L'adoption de ces principes aura pour effet au moins de retarder le processus de déréglementation dans les économies en transition et probablement aussi de préserver la structure cartellisée des marchés de services publics.L'économie de la réglementation, et par implication, l'économie de la déréglementation est une contribution émanant de l'Ecole d'Economie de Chicago. Parce que les "processus de déréglemen- tation" en vigueur induisent des réglementations plus drastiques, l'expression appropriée devrait plutôt être la re-réglementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Schwarz Jiri, 2001. "Deregulation vs. Re-regulation," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 1-18, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:11:y:2001:i:4:n:5
    DOI: 10.2202/1145-6396.1034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cto:journl:v:20:y:2001:i:3:p:327-358 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    2. Edward Stringham & Peter Boettke, 2006. "The failings of legal centralism for helping stock markets in transition," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(1), pages 22-34.

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