IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Deregulation vs. Re-regulation

Listed author(s):
  • Schwarz Jiri

    (Liberalni Institut, Prague)

Registered author(s):

    The classical liberal approach to deregulation is based on the consecutive elimination of state regulatory activities and their substitution by competitive market structure. Increasing competition accompanied with decreasing arbitrary state agencies interventions will undoubtedly cultivate the behaviour of market agents and bring benefits to consumers.The classical liberal approach to deregulation is incompatible with the EU deregulation model, which in case of network industries is still based on the permanent existence of regulatory agencies, Third-Party-Access, public service liability, centralized control of investments and the negative reciprocity. The adoption of these principals will at least delay deregulation process in transition economies but will likely preserve the cartel structure on the utility markets.Economics of regulation and implicitly economics of deregulation is a product of the Chicago School of Economics. Since current deregulation process leads to tighter regulation, the adequate term for it should be the reregulation.Lapproche libérale classique de la réglementation repose sur lélimination de la réglementation étatique et leur substitution par des structures marchandes concurrentielles. Une concurrence accrue et une diminution des interventions arbitraires de létat ne pourront que modifier le comportement des agents sur le marché et engendrer des bénéfices pour les consommateurs.Lapproche de la déréglementation du libéralisme classique est incompatible avec le modèle de déréglementation de lUnion Européenne : dans le cas des industries en réseau, ce dernier demeure fondé sur lexistence continue dagences de réglementation, la responsabilité du service public, le contrôle centralisé des investissements et la réciprocité négative. Ladoption de ces principes aura pour effet au moins de retarder le processus de déréglementation dans les économies en transition et probablement aussi de préserver la structure cartellisée des marchés de services publics.Léconomie de la réglementation, et par implication, léconomie de la déréglementation est une contribution émanant de lEcole dEconomie de Chicago. Parce que les processus de déréglemen- tation en vigueur induisent des réglementations plus drastiques, lexpression appropriée devrait plutôt être la re-réglementation.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 1-18

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:11:y:2001:i:4:n:5
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Web:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    in new window

    1. repec:cto:journl:v:20:y:2001:i:3:p:327-358 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:11:y:2001:i:4:n:5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.