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Reinsurance for High Health Costs: Benefits, Limitations, and Alternatives

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Listed:
  • Dow William H

    (University of California, Berkeley)

  • Fulton Brent D

    (University of California, Berkeley)

  • Baicker Katherine

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

Government-sponsored reinsurance for individuals with high health costs is a commonly proposed strategy to improve access and affordability in the individual and small-group health insurance markets. While reinsurance may have some benefits, other schemes may be more effective at accomplishing the same goals at lower cost. Reinsurance can be seen as a crude special case of risk-adjusted insurance subsidies. This paper estimates the effect of different reinsurance schemes on insurance premiums and insurers' disincentives to enroll potentially high-cost individuals. We find that reinsurance is relatively ineffective at reducing cream-skimming incentives and argue that more sophisticated risk-adjustment schemes are more effective, particularly under community rating with guaranteed issue. Although in the past risk adjustment had been considered too complex to implement in practice, recent experience suggests that it is now feasible, and we argue that incorporation of risk adjustment would strengthen current health insurance reform efforts.

Suggested Citation

  • Dow William H & Fulton Brent D & Baicker Katherine, 2010. "Reinsurance for High Health Costs: Benefits, Limitations, and Alternatives," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1-23, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:fhecpo:v:13:y:2010:i:2:n:7
    DOI: 10.2202/1558-9544.1190
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bijlsma, Michiel & Boone, Jan & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2017. "The complementarity between risk adjustment and community rating: Distorting market outcomes to facilitate redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 21-37.
    2. Bijlsma, M. & Boone, Jan & Zwart, G.T.J., 2015. "Community Rating in Health Insurance : Trade-Off Between Coverage and Selection," Other publications TiSEM f95e5efa-523c-48e2-9ea1-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Michiel Bijlsma & Jan Boone & Gijsbert Zwart, 2014. "Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 792-815, December.
    4. Timothy J. Layton & Thomas G. McGuire & Anna D. Sinaiko, 2016. "Risk Corridors and Reinsurance in Health Insurance Marketplaces: Insurance for Insurers," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 2(1), pages 66-95, January.
    5. Timothy J. Layton & Thomas G. McGuire & Anna D. Sinaiko, 2016. "Risk Corridors and Reinsurance in Health Insurance Marketplaces: Insurance for Insurers," American Journal of Health Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 66-95, Winter.

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