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Using Market Design to Reform the US Electoral College

Author

Listed:
  • Boudreau James

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, USA)

  • Cramton Peter

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany)

  • Katzman Brett

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, USA)

  • Mathews Timothy

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, USA)

  • Schwartz Jesse A.

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, USA)

Abstract

No election rules are perfect, but they can be better. The Electoral College is increasingly failing to represent voter preferences in determining election winners. A path to reform begins with identifying election goals and establishing voting rules that best achieve these goals.

Suggested Citation

  • Boudreau James & Cramton Peter & Katzman Brett & Mathews Timothy & Schwartz Jesse A., 2025. "Using Market Design to Reform the US Electoral College," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 22(1), pages 5-23.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:22:y:2025:i:1:p:5-23:n:1004
    DOI: 10.1515/ev-2024-0076
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting rules; market design; election reform; Electoral College; popular vote;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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