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Using Market Design to Reform the US Electoral College

Author

Listed:
  • Boudreau James

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, USA)

  • Cramton Peter

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany)

  • Katzman Brett

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, USA)

  • Mathews Timothy

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, USA)

  • Schwartz Jesse A.

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, USA)

Abstract

No election rules are perfect, but they can be better. The Electoral College is increasingly failing to represent voter preferences in determining election winners. A path to reform begins with identifying election goals and establishing voting rules that best achieve these goals.

Suggested Citation

  • Boudreau James & Cramton Peter & Katzman Brett & Mathews Timothy & Schwartz Jesse A., 2025. "Using Market Design to Reform the US Electoral College," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 22(1), pages 5-23.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:22:y:2025:i:1:p:5-23:n:1004
    DOI: 10.1515/ev-2024-0076
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-252, May.
    2. Peter Cramton, 2013. "Spectrum Auction Design," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
    3. Peter Cramton, 2022. "Fostering Resiliency with Good Market Design: Lessons from Texas," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 145, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    4. Asaf D. M. Nitzan & Shmuel I. Nitzan, 2024. "Balancing democracy: majoritarianism versus expression of preference intensity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 149-171, July.
    5. Casella, Alessandra, 2012. "Storable Votes: Protecting the Minority Voice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195309089, Decembrie.
    6. Robert J. Gordon, 2016. "Perspectives on The Rise and Fall of American Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 72-76, May.
    7. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    8. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2011. "Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015137, December.
    9. Brian Merlob & Charles R. Plott & Yuanjun Zhang, 2012. "The CMS Auction: Experimental Studies of a Median-Bid Procurement Auction with Nonbinding Bids," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(2), pages 793-827.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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