Who Supports Compensation? Individual Preferences for Trade-Related Unemployment Insurance
The political economy of trade literature argues that the policy of compensating those who lose from trade is an important component of maintaining public support for free-trade, a linkage known as the compensation hypothesis or embedded liberalism thesis. This article tests the causal mechanisms underlying the compensation hypothesis by examining support for trade-related compensation using survey data from the United States. Expectations about the effects of trade strongly predict support for trade-related unemployment insurance, with those who expect to lose more likely to support and those who expect to gain more like to oppose, but has no influence on support for general unemployment insurance despite previous research suggesting it should.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- I. M. Destler, 2005. "American Trade Politics 4th Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 3829, January.
- Scheve, Kenneth & Stasavage, David, 2006. "Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 255-286, July.
- Dani Rodrik, 1997. "Has Globalization Gone Too Far?," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 57, January.
- Dani Rodrik, 1996.
"Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?,"
NBER Working Papers
5537, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
- Rodrik, Dani, 1996. "Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1388, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Adserà, Alícia & Boix, Carles, 2002. "Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(02), pages 229-262, March.
- Rudra, Nita, 2002. "Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-Developed Countries," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(02), pages 411-445, March.
- Mansfield, Edward D. & Mutz, Diana C., 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(03), pages 425-457, July.
- Ruggie, John Gerard, 1982. "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(02), pages 379-415, March.
- Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2001. "Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 109, January.
- Balcells Ventura Laia, 2006. "Trade Openness and Preferences for Redistribution: A Cross-National Assessment of the Compensation Hypothesis," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 1-52, August.
- Kono Daniel Y, 2008. "Does Public Opinion Affect Trade Policy?," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-21, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:12:y:2010:i:1:n:3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.