Optimism and Bargaining Inefficiency
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1516
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Cited by:
- Dongkyu Chang & Duk Gyoo Kim & Wooyoung Lim, 2022. "Positive and Negative Selection in Bargaining: An Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 9908, CESifo.
- Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan & Jinchun Zhang & Qiang Zeng, 2021. "Bargaining Game with Altruistic and Spiteful Preferences," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 277-300, April.
- Mihai Manea, 2011. "Bargaining in Stationary Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 2042-2080, August.
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Keywords
bargaining; optimism; delay; efficiency loss;All these keywords.
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