On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Two-Person, Two-State Finance Economies
The effect of replacing an agent in a two-person two-state finance economy by a more risk averse agent is studied. It is established under which conditions the other agent benefits or looses in equilibrium from dealing with a more risk averse agent. If one agent becomes more risk averse, then the equilibrium allocation moves towards that agent's certainty line. Whether or not that is beneficial for the other agent depends on the location of the endowment point.
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Volume (Year): 7 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Berden Caroline & Peters Hans, 2005.
"On the effect of risk aversion in bimatrix games,"
029, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521586054 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kobberling, Veronika & Peters, Hans, 2003.
"The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 154-175, May.
- Peters Hans & Köbberling Vera, 2000. "The Effect of Decision Weights in Bargaining Problems," Research Memorandum 037, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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