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Tenacious Selection of Nash Equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Alioğulları Zeynel Harun

    (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Istiklal Cad. 10, Ulus, 06100 Ankara, Turkey FASS, Sabancı University, Orhanlı, Tuzla, 34956, Istanbul, Turkey)

  • Barlo Mehmet

    (FASS, Sabancı University, Orhanlı, Tuzla, 34956, Istanbul, Turkey)

Abstract

We propose a complexity measure and an associated refinement based on the observation that best responses with more variations call for more precise anticipation. The variations around strategy profiles are measured by considering the cardinalities of players’ pure strategy best responses when others’ behavior is perturbed. After showing that the resulting selection method displays desirable properties, it is employed to deliver a refinement: the tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium. We prove that it exists; does not have containment relations with perfection, properness, persistence and other refinements; and possesses some desirable features.

Suggested Citation

  • Alioğulları Zeynel Harun & Barlo Mehmet, 2016. "Tenacious Selection of Nash Equilibrium," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 633-647, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:16:y:2016:i:2:p:633-647:n:10
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2015-0055
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    2. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812, Decembrie.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    anticipation; complexity; refinements of Nash equilibrium; perfect; proper; persistent;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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