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Risk Taking and Aggression On and Off the Field: Evidence from the National Football League

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  • Ge Qi

    (Department of Economics, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604, USA)

Abstract

We study the behavioral link between NFL players’ off-field misconduct and their on-field infractions by matching a comprehensive dataset of players’ off-field arrests with detailed record of on-field penalty calls. Results from Poisson regressions indicate that players with arrest record are likewise observed to have significantly higher tendencies for aggression-related penalties, implying their inherent preferences toward risks or aggression. Such association is particularly salient among repeat offenders. We also find that repeat offenders boast stronger overall career performance and longer career span compared to non-offenders and one-time offenders, suggesting that the related behavioral traits can be instrumental to job performance in professional football.

Suggested Citation

  • Ge Qi, 2019. "Risk Taking and Aggression On and Off the Field: Evidence from the National Football League," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(3), pages 1-9, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:19:y:2019:i:3:p:9:n:8
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2018-0195
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Snyder Kevin & Lopez Michael, 2015. "Consistency, accuracy, and fairness: a study of discretionary penalties in the NFL," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 219-230, December.
    3. Block, Michael K & Gerety, Vernon E, 1995. "Some Experimental Evidence on Differences between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 123-138, January.
    4. Carl Kitchens, 2014. "Identifying Changes In The Spatial Distribution Of Crime: Evidence From A Referee Experiment In The National Football League," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 259-268, January.
    5. Michael J. Lopez, 2016. "Persuaded Under Pressure: Evidence From The National Football League," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(4), pages 1763-1773, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alex Farnell, 2023. "False Start? An Analysis of NFL Penalties With and Without Crowds," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 24(6), pages 695-716, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • Z2 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics

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