The Effect of Vertically Differentiated Entry Under Retail-Minus Access Pricing
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2014-0033
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Keywords
; ; ;JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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