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How do racial stereotypes affect social preferences? An experimental investigation

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  • Angela Cristiane Santos Póvoa
  • Andressa Margareth Assaka,
  • Wesley Pech

Abstract

Objective We analyzed how racial stereotypes in Brazil affect monetary allocations in bargaining and distribution settings. Methods We conducted an ultimatum game (UG) and a dictator game (DG) in which first movers received information about the race of their counterparts before making allocation decisions. We also implemented a postexperiment questionnaire that asked subjects about the beliefs and motivations that helped them make the decisions. Results Afro‐Brazilians received significantly larger transfers/offers in both games than white Brazilians. The postexperiment survey indicated that the main reason for the increase in pro‐social behavior was the belief that Afro‐Brazilians have, on average, lower levels of income and are more in need of a generous offer/transfer. Conclusion Afro‐Brazilians were perceived by first movers as “people in need of care,” which in turn drove subjects not only to transfer more to them in the DG but also caused first movers to make more generous offers in the UG. The study contributes to the social preferences literature by highlighting how stereotypes about a particular race influence people's decisions in dividing a resource.

Suggested Citation

  • Angela Cristiane Santos Póvoa & Andressa Margareth Assaka, & Wesley Pech, 2022. "How do racial stereotypes affect social preferences? An experimental investigation," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 103(4), pages 883-891, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:103:y:2022:i:4:p:883-891
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.13160
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    3. Griffin, John & Nickerson, David & Wozniak, Abigail, 2012. "Racial differences in inequality aversion: Evidence from real world respondents in the ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 600-617.
    4. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
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