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Adam Smith's “tolerable administration of justice” and the Wealth of Nations

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  • Douglas A. Irwin

Abstract

Adam Smith argues that a country’s income depends on its labor productivity, which in turn hinges on the division of labor. But why are some countries able to take advantage of the division of labor and become rich, while others fail to do so and remain poor? Smith describes how the security of property rights, through a “tolerable administration of justice,” allows investment and exchange to take place, bringing about economic progress. Recent empirical work on economic development has supported Smith’s emphasis on a country’s political “institutions,” particularly the judiciary, in determining its national income.

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  • Douglas A. Irwin, 2020. "Adam Smith's “tolerable administration of justice” and the Wealth of Nations," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(3), pages 231-247, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:67:y:2020:i:3:p:231-247
    DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12229
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