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Fiscal Rules, Interest Payments on Debt, and the Irrelevance of the Taylor Principle

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  • Ludger Linnemann
  • Andreas Schabert

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  • Ludger Linnemann & Andreas Schabert, 2012. "Fiscal Rules, Interest Payments on Debt, and the Irrelevance of the Taylor Principle," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 59(3), pages 250-265, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:59:y:2012:i:3:p:250-265
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ludger Linnemann & Andreas Schabert, 2010. "Debt Nonneutrality, Policy Interactions, And Macroeconomic Stability," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(2), pages 461-474, May.
    2. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2007. "Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(6), pages 1702-1725, September.
    3. Leith, Campbell & von Thadden, Leopold, 2008. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 279-313, May.
    4. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    5. Matthew Canzoneri & Robert Cumby & Behzad Diba & David López‐Salido, 2008. "Monetary Aggregates and Liquidity in a Neo‐Wicksellian Framework," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(8), pages 1667-1698, December.
    6. Henning Bohn, 1998. "The Behavior of U. S. Public Debt and Deficits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 949-963.
    7. Jordi Galí & J. David López-Salido & Javier Vallés, 2007. "Understanding the Effects of Government Spending on Consumption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(1), pages 227-270, March.
    8. Blanchard, Olivier J, 1985. "Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(2), pages 223-247, April.
    9. Leeper, Eric M., 1991. "Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-147, February.
    10. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 1997. "Balanced-Budget Rules, Distortionary Taxes, and Aggregate Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 976-1000, October.
    11. Canzoneri, Matthew & Cumby, Robert & Diba, Behzad, 2010. "The Interaction Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 17, pages 935-999, Elsevier.
    12. Guo, Jang-Ting & Harrison, Sharon G., 2004. "Balanced-budget rules and macroeconomic (in)stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 357-363, December.
    13. Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 2000. "Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages 93-108, March.
    14. Canzoneri, Matthew B. & Diba, Behzad T., 2005. "Interest rate rules and price determinacy: The role of transactions services of bonds," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 329-343, March.
    15. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis Bonam & Jasper Lukkezen, 2014. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination, Macroeconomic Stability, and Sovereign Risk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-006/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Carolina Ulloa-Suarez & Oscar Valencia, 2022. "Do governments stick to their announced fiscal rules? A study of Latin American and the Caribbean countries," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03994711, HAL.

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