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An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Intermediaries on the Outcome of Bargaining Games

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  • Abdullah Yavas
  • Thomas J. Miceli
  • C.F. Sirmans

Abstract

We conduct an experimental analysis of the bargaining between a buyer and a seller of the exchange of a single good by means of an intermediary or broker. We examine how an intermediary affects the price, the likelihood of a successful negotiation, and the time it takes to complete a negotiation. We first examine the impact of the intermediary as a pure middleman, and then as an information source about the distribution of seller and buyer reservation prices. The results show that an intermediary, whether or not informed, increases the sale price, reduces the likelihood of an agreement, and increases the time to reach an agreement (though the number of bargaining rounds declines). The results suggest that the benefits of brokerage may be predominantly in the matching of buyers and sellers rather than in facilitating bargaining.

Suggested Citation

  • Abdullah Yavas & Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, 2001. "An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Intermediaries on the Outcome of Bargaining Games," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 29(2), pages 251-276.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:29:y:2001:i:2:p:251-276
    DOI: 10.1111/1080-8620.00010
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    Cited by:

    1. Rustamdjan Hakimov & C.-Philipp Heller & Dorothea Kübler & Morimitsu Kurino, 2021. "How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(7), pages 2127-2151, July.
    2. Thomas Miceli & Katherine Pancak & C. Sirmans, 2007. "Is the Compensation Model for Real Estate Brokers Obsolete?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 7-22, July.
    3. Cadigan, John & Schmitt, Pamela & Shupp, Robert & Swope, Kurtis, 2011. "The holdout problem and urban sprawl: Experimental evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 72-81, January.
    4. J’Noel Gardiner & Jeffrey Heisler & Jarl Kallberg & Crocker Liu, 2007. "The Impact of Dual Agency," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 39-55, July.
    5. Andres Jauregui & Diane Hite, 2010. "The impact of real estate agents on house prices near environmental disamenities," Housing Policy Debate, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(2), pages 295-316, March.
    6. Thomas Miceli & Katherine A. Pancak & C. F. Sirmans, 2000. "Restructuring Agency Relationships in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry: An Economic Analysis," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 20(1), pages 31-47.
    7. Virginie Baritaux & Magali Aubert & Etienne Montaigne & Hervé Remaud, 2006. "Matchmakers in wine marketing channels: The case of French wine brokers," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(3), pages 375-390.
    8. Darren K. Hayunga & Henry J. Munneke, 2021. "Examining Both Sides of the Transaction: Bargaining in the Housing Market," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(2), pages 663-691, June.
    9. J. Benjamin & P. Chinloy & G. Jud & D. Winkler, 2007. "Do Some People Work Harder than Others? Evidence from Real Estate Brokerage," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 95-110, July.
    10. Simon Stevenson & James Young, 2015. "The Role of Undisclosed Reserves in English Open Outcry Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 375-402, June.
    11. Sahin, M. Abdullah & Sirmans, C.F. & Yavas, Abdullah, 2013. "Buyer brokerage: Experimental evidence," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 265-277.
    12. Carl R. Gwin & Seow-Eng Ong & Andrew C. Spieler, 2005. "Auctions and Land Values: An Experimental Analysis," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 42(12), pages 2245-2259, November.
    13. David M. Harrison & Kimberly F. Luchtenberg & Michael J. Seiler, 2023. "Improving Mortgage Default Collection Efforts by Employing the Decoy Effect," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(4), pages 840-860, May.
    14. Dean Gatzlaff & Peng Liu, 2013. "List Price Information in the Negotiation of Commercial Real Estate Transactions: Is Silence Golden?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 760-786, November.
    15. Charles Leung & Youngman Leong & Siu Wong, 2006. "Housing Price Dispersion: An Empirical Investigation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 357-385, May.
    16. Vrinda Kadiyali & Jeffrey Prince & Daniel Simon, 2014. "Is Dual Agency in Real Estate a Cause for Concern?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 164-195, January.
    17. Yang Zhang & Hong Zhang & Michael J. Seiler, 2016. "The Effects of Time Constraints on Broker Behavior in China¡¦s Resale Housing Market: Theory and Evidence," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 19(3), pages 353-370.
    18. Thomas Kalbro & Hans Lind, 1999. "Valuing Easements: Some Experimental Evidence," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 18(3), pages 491-502.
    19. David M. Harrison & Kimberly F. Luchtenberg & Michael J. Seiler, 2023. "Improving Mortgage Default Collection Efforts by Employing the Decoy Effect," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(4), pages 840-860, May.
    20. Michael J. Seiler, 2014. "Measuring the Impact of Eminent Domain Partial Takings: A Behavioral Approach," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 17(2), pages 137-156.
    21. Fan, Ying & Fu, Yuqi & Yang, Zan & Chen, Ming, 2023. "Search Frictions in Rental Markets: Evidence from Urban China," Working Paper Series 23/11, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance.
    22. Yang Zhang & Hong Zhang & Michael J. Seiler, 2014. "The Effects of Demand Specification and Search Patience on the Buyer Search Process in China's Resale Housing Market: An Experimental Study," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 275-299.

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