Optimal Commodity Taxation with a Representative Agent
It is argued that the task of describing the optimal vector of commodity taxes is trivialized by the traditional assumption of a price-taking representative agent; that, in particular, the assumption of a representative agent ensures that the null vector is optimal. Copyright © 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Volume (Year): 11 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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