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The Spanish Origins of Extractive Institutions in the Philippines

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  • Prince Christian Cruz

Abstract

type="main"> Why did the Spanish colonisers of the Philippines establish extractive institutions? Using an explicit rational choice framework, the article examines the demand for institutions of Spanish settlers during the conquest period. It provides a framework for analysing the incentive structure faced by individuals that lead them to demand, create, and preserve certain types of institutions. The article argues that extractive institutions were demanded and supplied to minimise the uncertainty brought by high mortality and the relatively low wealth in the Philippines.

Suggested Citation

  • Prince Christian Cruz, 2014. "The Spanish Origins of Extractive Institutions in the Philippines," Australian Economic History Review, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 54(1), pages 62-82, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ozechr:v:54:y:2014:i:1:p:62-82
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/aehr.12035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lakshmi Iyer & Noel Maurer, 2008. "The Cost of Property Rights: Establishing Institutions on the Philippine Frontier Under American Rule, 1898-1918," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-023, Harvard Business School, revised Apr 2009.
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    5. Larry A. Sjaastad, 1970. "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Harry W. Richardson (ed.), Regional Economics, chapter 9, pages 115-133, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Raul V. Fabella, 2003. "The comprehensive agrarian reform program and Coase theorem," Philippine Review of Economics, University of the Philippines School of Economics and Philippine Economic Society, vol. 40(1), pages 109-200, June.
    7. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
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    9. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1231-1294.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Batu, 2017. "Poverty and the Colonial Origins of Elite Capture: Evidence from Philippine Provinces," Working Papers 1708, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.

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