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Economic Growth and Potential Punishment Under Dictatorship

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  • Abel Escribà‐Folch

Abstract

This paper explores whether the probability of being punished after losing power leads dictators to restrain their level of predation and, thus, increase economic growth. To do so, a simple model of predatory rule is developed, and the consequences of an increasing probability of punishment after loosing power explored. New data on dictators' post‐exit fate have permitted to estimate the predicted probability of punishment taking place by using multinomial logit. Outgoing dictators' strength and the international context are shown to be the main determinants of post‐exit scenarios. The probability of punishment is proven to have a positive and significant effect on the rate of growth of GDP under alternative specifications of growth regressions.

Suggested Citation

  • Abel Escribà‐Folch, 2007. "Economic Growth and Potential Punishment Under Dictatorship," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 187-210, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:60:y:2007:i:2:p:187-210
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.2007.00368.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jody Overland & Kenneth Simons & Michael Spagat, 2005. "Political instability and growth in dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 445-470, December.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Anjali Thomas Bohlken, 2010. "Coups, Elections and the Predatory State," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(2), pages 169-215, April.
    3. Adekoya Adenuga Fabian & Abdul Razak Nor Azam, 2017. "The Dynamic Relationship between Crime and Economic Growth in Nigeria," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 53(1), pages 47-64, March.

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