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Corrigendum to "Money launderers and tax havens: Two sides of the same coin?" [Int. Rev. Law Econ. 31 (2011) 37-47]

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  • Schwarz, Peter

Abstract

This paper investigates whether tax havens have an incentive to maintain low regulatory standards in order to attract black money activities. Using a new dataset on money laundering regulation, the results of this study show that tax haven and money laundering services coincide within the same country. This effect is especially observable for regulative instruments which increase the probability of detecting money laundering; whereas in the case of punitive regulation for money laundering the complementary relationship is weaker, perhaps due to a "false friends" effect. If we classify tax havens according to their per capita GDP, poorer tax havens in particular tend to supply both services, because the gains from their tax haven status are low compared to those of wealthier and well-established tax havens. From a policy perspective the results add new insights to the debate on the welfare effects of tax havens since the results suggest that poorer tax havens might be reluctant to provide the necessary regulatory environment in order to constrain money laundering. This externality is beyond the familiar tax revenue effects caused by tax havens.
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Suggested Citation

  • Schwarz, Peter, 2011. "Corrigendum to "Money launderers and tax havens: Two sides of the same coin?" [Int. Rev. Law Econ. 31 (2011) 37-47]," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 147-147, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:31:y:2011:i:2:p:147-147
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    Cited by:

    1. Jurušs Māris, 2017. "Criteria for Defining Tax Evasion as Tax Terrorism," Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 30(1), pages 102-112, April.
    2. Mihai-Bogdan AFRASINEI & Iuliana Eugenia GEORGESCU & Costel ISTRATE, 2016. "The Influence Of The Connections Of Romanian Non-Listed Firms To Tax Havens On Their Profitability," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 8(4), pages 572-596, December.
    3. repec:idb:brikps:81941 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Lucia Rossel & Brigitte Unger & Joras Ferwerda, 2022. "Shedding light inside the black box of implementation: Tax crimes as a predicate crime for money laundering," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(3), pages 781-800, July.
    5. Isaac Ofoeda & Elikplimi K. Agbloyor & Joshua Y. Abor & Kofi A. Osei, 2022. "Anti‐money laundering regulations and financial sector development," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(4), pages 4085-4104, October.
    6. Shafik Hebous, 2014. "Money at the Docks of Tax Havens: A Guide," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(3), pages 458-485, September.
    7. Olga Balakina & Angelo D’Andrea & Donato Masciandaro, 2017. "Bank secrecy in offshore centres and capital flows: Does blacklisting matter?," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(1), pages 30-57, January.
    8. D’Avino, Carmela, 2023. "Counteracting offshore tax evasion: Evidence from the foreign account tax compliance act," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    9. Anken, F. & Beasley, J.E., 2012. "Corporate structure optimisation for multinational companies," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 230-243, April.
    10. Carmela D’Avino, 2023. "Money laundering and AML regulatory and judicial system regimes: investigation of FinCEN files," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 195-223, April.

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