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Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance: The Competitive Effect of Information-Insensitive Triggers

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  • Silke Finken
  • Christian Laux

Abstract

We identify a new benefit of index or parametric triggers. Asymmetric information between reinsurers on an insurer's risk affects competition in the reinsurance market: reinsurers are subject to adverse selection, since only high-risk insurers may find it optimal to change reinsurers. The result is high reinsurance premiums and cross-subsidization of high-risk insurers by low-risk insurers. A contract with a parametric or index trigger (such as a catastrophe bond) is insensitive to information asymmetry and therefore alters the equilibrium in the reinsurance market. Provided that basis risk is not too high, the introduction of contracts with parametric or index triggers provides low-risk insurers with an alternative to reinsurance contracts, and therefore leads to less cross-subsidization in the reinsurance market. Copyright (c) The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2009.

Suggested Citation

  • Silke Finken & Christian Laux, 2009. "Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance: The Competitive Effect of Information-Insensitive Triggers," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 579-605.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:76:y:2009:i:3:p:579-605
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Patricia H. Born & Barbara Klimaszewski-Blettner, 2013. "Should I Stay or Should I Go? The Impact of Natural Disasters and Regulation on U.S. Property Insurers’ Supply Decisions," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 80(1), pages 1-36, March.
    2. Wolfgang Karl Härdle & Brenda López Cabrera, 2010. "Calibrating CAT Bonds for Mexican Earthquakes," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 625-650.
    3. Gibson, Rajna & Habib, Michel A. & Ziegler, Alexandre, 2014. "Reinsurance or securitization: The case of natural catastrophe risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 79-100.
    4. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    5. Loris Lino Maria Nadotti & Laura-Gabriela Constantin, 2014. "Catastrophe Bonds Structures at European Level – A Cluster Analysis Approach," Romanian Economic Journal, Department of International Business and Economics from the Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest, vol. 17(54), pages 115-141, December.
    6. Jakob Eberl & Darko Jus, 2012. "Evaluating policies to attain the optimal exposure to nuclear risk," RSCAS Working Papers 2012/50, European University Institute.
    7. Marc Gürtler & Martin Hibbeln & Christine Winkelvos, 2016. "The Impact of the Financial Crisis and Natural Catastrophes on CAT Bonds," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(3), pages 579-612, September.
    8. Lo, Chien-Ling & Lee, Jin-Ping & Yu, Min-Teh, 2013. "Valuation of insurers’ contingent capital with counterparty risk and price endogeneity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5025-5035.
    9. Antonio Coviello & Giovanni Di Trapani, 2013. "Supply Risk Management: Mitigation Strategy," The International Journal of Economic Behavior - IJEB, Faculty of Business and Administration, University of Bucharest, vol. 3(1), pages 169-176, December.
    10. Mondher bellalah & Shirley Mardonez & Omar Masood, 2013. "How can non-life insurance linked securities be sustainable? (Mexico Case Study)," THEMA Working Papers 2013-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    11. Hagendorff, Bjoern & Hagendorff, Jens & Keasey, Kevin & Gonzalez, Angelica, 2014. "The risk implications of insurance securitization: The case of catastrophe bonds," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 387-402.
    12. J. David Cummins & Philippe Trainar, 2009. "Securitization, Insurance, and Reinsurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 463-492.
    13. Nadine Gatzert & Hato Schmeiser, 2011. "Industry loss warranties: contract features, pricing, and central demand factors," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 13(1), pages 13-31, December.

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