Deterring Fraud: The Role of General Damage Awards in Automobile Insurance Settlements
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References listed on IDEAS
- Bond, Eric W. & Crocker, Keith J., 1997.
"Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs,"
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche 1233, CIRPEE.
- repec:spr:grdene:v:21:y:2012:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-011-9241-y is not listed on IDEAS
- Scalera Domenico & Zazzaro Alberto, 2007. "The Unpleasant Effects of Price Deregulation in the European Third-Party Motor Insurance Market: A Theoretical Framework," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-30, October.
- Mercedes Ayuso(universitat de Barcelona) & Miguel Santolino(Universitat de Barcelona), 2009. "Individual prediction of automobile bodily injury claims liabilities," Working Papers in Economics 220, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Andrea Gallice, 2012.
"Strategic Announcements of Reference Points in Disputes and Litigations,"
003, Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
- Andrea Gallice, 2012. "Strategic announcements of reference points in disputes and litigations," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 279, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Mercedes Ayuso & Miguel Santolino, 2008. "Forecasting the maximum compensation offer in the automobile BI claims negotiation proces," IREA Working Papers 200807, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised May 2008.
- repec:spd:journl:v:67:y:2017:i:2:p:69-84 is not listed on IDEAS
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