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Analyzing Speech to Detect Financial Misreporting

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  • JESSEN L. HOBSON
  • WILLIAM J. MAYEW
  • MOHAN VENKATACHALAM

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  • Jessen L. Hobson & William J. Mayew & Mohan Venkatachalam, 2012. "Analyzing Speech to Detect Financial Misreporting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 349-392, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:50:y:2012:i:2:p:349-392 DOI: j.1475-679X.2011.00433.x
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    Cited by:

    1. S. McKay Price & Michael J. Seiler & Jiancheng Shen, 2017. "Do Investors Infer Vocal Cues from CEOs During Quarterly REIT Conference Calls?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, pages 515-557.
    2. Dichev, Ilia D. & Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R. & Rajgopal, Shiva, 2013. "Earnings quality: Evidence from the field," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-33.
    3. Houdou Basse Mama & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2017. "Investor Relations' Quality and Mispricing," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-33, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    4. Lorenzo Patelli & Matteo Pedrini, 2015. "Is Tone at the Top Associated with Financial Reporting Aggressiveness?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, pages 3-19.
    5. Hoberg, Gerard & Lewis, Craig, 2017. "Do fraudulent firms produce abnormal disclosure?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 58-85.
    6. Ian D. Gow & Steven N. Kaplan & David F. Larcker & Anastasia A. Zakolyukina, 2016. "CEO Personality and Firm Policies," NBER Working Papers 22435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Maria Steinmeier, 2016. "Fraud in Sustainability Departments? An Exploratory Study," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, pages 477-492.
    8. Lauren Cohen & Dong Lou & Christopher Malloy, 2013. "Playing Favorites: How Firms Prevent the Revelation of Bad News," NBER Working Papers 19429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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