Corporate Financial Policy and the Theory of Financial Intermediation
This paper examines the optimal structure of financial contracts in an economy subject to two forms of moral hazard. Multiple information problems are shown to generate a role for multiple classes of financial claimants. The author then shows that economic efficiency is enhanced if the financial structure of the economy consists of both direct and intermediated financial contract markets. Consequently, his results demonstrate a motivation for the complementarity between capital markets and depository financial institutions. Copyright 1990 by American Finance Association.
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Volume (Year): 45 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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