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Financially Interlinked Business Groups

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  • Maitreesh Ghatak
  • Raja Kali

Abstract

Financial interlinkage, in the form of cross-holding of equity and debt between firms, characterizes business groups in many countries. We suggest that such financial interlinkage can be viewed as a way to solve credit rationing caused by asymmetric information. If firms possess better information about each other than a bank, then business groups can be a mechanism to induce firms to sort on the basis of this information. Banks can offer a menu of contracts that vary in the extent of financial interlinkage to induce firms to self-select on the basis of the equilibrium composition of the business groups they can form. Copyright (c) 2001 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Maitreesh Ghatak & Raja Kali, 2001. "Financially Interlinked Business Groups," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 591-619, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:10:y:2001:i:4:p:591-619
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
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    Cited by:

    1. Domenico Scalera & Alberto Zazzaro, 2009. "Do Inter-Firm Networks Make Access to Finance Easier? Issues and Empirical Evidence," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 25, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    2. Christa Hainz, 2007. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Financial Control and Sequential Investments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(2), pages 336-355, June.
    3. repec:kap:asiapa:v:34:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10490-016-9477-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Feenstra, Robert C. & Huang, Deng-Shing & Hamilton, Gary G., 2003. "A market-power based model of business groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 459-485, August.
    5. Sumon K. Bhaumik & Ying Zhou, 2014. "Do business groups help or hinder technological progress in emerging markets? Evidence from India," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp1066, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    6. Gonenc, Halit & Hermes, Niels, 2008. "Propping: Evidence from new share issues of Turkish business group firms," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 261-275, July.
    7. Christa Hainz, 2006. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets-Financial Control & Sequential Investment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp830, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    8. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Ekta Selarka, 2008. "Impact of M&A on firm performance in India: Implications for concentration of ownership and insider entrenchment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp907, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    9. Busetta, Giovanni & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 15-24.
    10. Christa Hainz, 2006. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets – Financial Control and Sequential Investment," CESifo Working Paper Series 1763, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Locorotondo, Rosy & Dewaelheyns, Nico & Van Hulle, Cynthia, 2014. "Cash holdings and business group membership," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 316-323.
    12. Anaïs HAMELIN, 2013. "Does Size Matter? Firm And Business Group Size Influence On The Benefits Of Group Affiliation," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2013-10, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    13. Macchiavello, Rocco, 2010. "Vertical integration and investor protection in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 162-172, November.
    14. Atif Ikram & Syed Ali Asjad Naqvi, 2005. "Family Business Groups and Tunneling Framework : Application and Evidence from Pakistan," Microeconomics Working Papers 22263, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    15. Giovanni BUSETTA & Alberto ZAZZARO, 2006. "Mutual Loan-Guarantee Societies in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection: Do They Act as a Sorting Device?," Working Papers 273, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    16. Rosy Locorotondo & Nico Dewaelheyns & Cynthia Hulle, 2015. "Affiliates’ Bank Debt Policy: Does Parent Firm Nationality Matter?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(5-6), pages 747-776, June.
    17. Rocco Macchiavello, 2007. "Vertical Integration, Missing Middle and Investor Protection in Developing Countries," Economics Series Working Papers 373, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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