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The Possibility of Issue‐Specific Decisions on Multiple Social Choice Issues

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  • Midori Hirokawa

Abstract

This paper considers an aggregation rule when each alternative consists of elements of multiple issues. I assume that each issue‐specific aggregation rule can be applied to each issue and explore whether various different issue‐specific aggregation rules are compatible. When the set of alternatives has some structure (which we call a set connected by loops), there exists a powerful individual whose preference always coincides with the social ordering in every issue. As a corollary, Arrow's General Possibility Theorem is obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Midori Hirokawa, 2003. "The Possibility of Issue‐Specific Decisions on Multiple Social Choice Issues," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 86-100, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:54:y:2003:i:1:p:86-100
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5876.00247
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156, June.
    2. Kelly, Jerry S., 1978. "Arrow Impossibility Theorems," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780124033504 edited by Shell, Karl.
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