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The Rise of Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: An Agenda for Future Research

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  • Marcel Hanegraaff
  • Arlo Poletti

Abstract

While the interest group literature suggests there is a consistent trend towards more corporate lobbying in various political systems, it remains unclear whether this also applies to EU lobbying. This study addresses this debate in three ways. Firstly, it takes stock of the extant literature and discusses some of the methodological hurdles that have rendered it difficult to provide conclusive evidence for the rise of corporate lobbying in the EU. Secondly, it offers some suggestions on how to address these problems and delivers some stylized facts by relying on two original datasets providing 7information on lobbying activities in the EU. In line with what has been observed in other political systems, our analysis shows that the EU lobbying community has experienced a quite dramatic increase of firm lobbying over the past ten years. Finally, it reflects on how to begin developing a systematic understanding of the factors explaining this phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Hanegraaff & Arlo Poletti, 2021. "The Rise of Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: An Agenda for Future Research," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 839-855, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:59:y:2021:i:4:p:839-855
    DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13132
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marcel Hanegraaff & Arlo Poletti & Emile Van Ommeren, 2024. "Firms and Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 629-652, May.
    2. Christian Reiner & Christian Bellak, 2023. "Hat die ökonomische Macht von Unternehmen in Österreich zugenommen? Teil 1," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 49(1), pages 21-59.
    3. Richard Bärnthaler & Andreas Novy & Lea Arzberger & Astrid Krisch & Hans Volmary, 2024. "The power to transform structures: power complexes and the challenges for realising a wellbeing economy," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-16, December.
    4. Kalk, Andrei & Sorger, Gerhard, 2023. "Climate policy under political pressure," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    5. Louise Curran & Carlos Carrasco-Farré, 2024. "Leveraging natural language processing techniques to explore the potential impact of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 7(2), pages 181-202, June.

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