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Shareholder Value Maximization-Is There a Role for Corporate Social Responsibility?


  • John Martin
  • William Petty
  • James Wallace


Although often viewed as inconsistent with the corporate goal of value maximization, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement can add value by helping companies develop and maintain their reputations for fair dealing with each of their important non-investor stakeholder groups, including employees, suppliers, and local communities. Such "reputational capital" in turn helps reinforce the commitment of those stakeholders through what amount to informal or implicit contracts-contracts that are often critical to a company's long-run success. Copyright Copyright (c) 2009 Morgan Stanley.

Suggested Citation

  • John Martin & William Petty & James Wallace, 2009. "Shareholder Value Maximization-Is There a Role for Corporate Social Responsibility?," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 21(2), pages 110-118.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jacrfn:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:110-118

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 32-42.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Rose, Caspar & Thomsen, Steen, 2004. "The Impact of Corporate Reputation on Performance:: Some Danish Evidence," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 201-210, April.
    4. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    5. Burton G. Malkiel, 2003. "The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 59-82, Winter.
    6. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    7. Borenstein, Severin & Zimmerman, Martin B, 1988. "Market Incentives for Safe Commercial Airline Operation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 913-935, December.
    8. Beatty, Randolph P. & Ritter, Jay R., 1986. "Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of initial public offerings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 213-232.
    9. Burton G. Malkiel, 2003. "The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics," Working Papers 111, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    10. Barbara Lougee & James Wallace, 2008. "The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Trend," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 20(1), pages 96-108.
    11. repec:pri:cepsud:91malkiel is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1993. "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 757-802, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pamela Queen, 2015. "Enlightened Shareholder Maximization: Is this Strategy Achievable?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 683-694, March.

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