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Labour's interest in corporate governance in the UK: are workers on the board back on the agenda?

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  • Catherine Casey

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  • Catherine Casey, 2016. "Labour's interest in corporate governance in the UK: are workers on the board back on the agenda?," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 46-61, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:indrel:v:47:y:2016:i:1:p:46-61
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/irj.12125
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521134132, Enero-Abr.
    2. Wright, Barbara, 2005. "The Cambridge Companion to Flaubert Timothy Unwin (Editor) Cambridge University Press, 2004, 234 pp," European Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(4), pages 661-664, October.
    3. Michel Aglietta & Antoine Rebérioux, 2005. "Corporate Governance Adrift," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3675, June.
    4. Edmund Heery & Stephen Wood, 2003. "Employment Relations and Corporate Governance," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 41(3), pages 477-479, September.
    5. Thomas Clarke, 2010. "Recurring Crises in Anglo-American Corporate Governance," Contributions to Political Economy, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 29(1), pages 9-32.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521118590, Enero-Abr.
    8. Paddy Ireland, 2010. "Limited liability, shareholder rights and the problem of corporate irresponsibility," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 34(5), pages 837-856.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chris Rees & Patrick Briône, 2024. "Employee voice at board level: Responses to the revised UK Corporate Governance Code and the prospects for workplace democracy," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 45(3), pages 816-834, August.
    2. Catherine Casey & Helen Delaney, 2022. "Keeping It Quiet? The Micro-Politics of Employee Voice in Company Strategic Decision-Making," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 36(3), pages 485-502, June.

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