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Mumbai's Development Mafias: Globalization, Organized Crime and Land Development

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  • LIZA WEINSTEIN

Abstract

For over a decade, researchers have analyzed the effects of liberalization and globalization on urban development, considering the local political implications of shifts at the national and global scales. Taking the case of Mumbai, this article examines how the past 15 years of political reforms in India have reshaped property markets and the politics of land development. Among the newly empowered actors, local criminal syndicates, often with global connections, have seized political opportunities created by these shifts to gain influence over land development. The rise of Mumbai's organized criminal activity in the 1950s was closely linked to India's macroeconomic policies, with strict regulation of imports fuelling the growth of black market smuggling. Liberalization and deregulation since the early 1990s have diminished demand for smuggled consumer goods and criminal syndicates have since diversified their operations. With skyrocketing real estate prices in the 1990s, bolstered by global land speculation, the mafia began investing in property development. Supported by an illicit nexus of politicians, bureaucrats and the police, the mafia has emerged as a central figure in Mumbai's land development politics. The article examines the structural shifts that facilitated the criminalization of land development and the implications of mafia involvement in local politics. Résumé Depuis plus d'une décennie, les chercheurs ont analysé les effets de la libéralisation et de la mondialisation sur l'aménagement urbain en étudiant les implications politiques locales de transformations effectuées à l'échelle nationale et planétaire. Prenant le cas de Mumbai, cet article examine comment les réformes politiques des quinze dernières années en Inde ont reconfiguré les marchés immobiliers et les politiques d'aménagement foncier. Parmi les nouveaux acteurs, les syndicats du crime locaux, opérant souvent dans des réseaux internationaux, ont saisi les occasions politiques créées par ces changements pour gagner en influence sur l'aménagement foncier. A Mumbai, l'activité accrue du crime organisé dans les années 1950 était étroitement liée aux politiques macroéconomiques de l'Inde, une réglementation stricte des importations alimentant l'essor de la contrebande sur le marché noir. Depuis le début des années 1990, libéralisation et déréglementation ont réduit la demande pour les biens de consommation de contrebande, poussant les syndicats du crime à diversifier leurs opérations. Face à la montée en flèche des prix de l'immobilier dans les années 1990, aidée par la spéculation foncière mondiale, la mafia a investi dans la promotion immobilière. Soutenue par un réseau illégal de politiciens, bureaucrates et policiers, elle est donc devenue un personnage central des politiques d'urbanisme à Mumbai. L'article étudie les transformations structurelles qui ont facilité la criminalisation du secteur foncier, et les implications de la présence de la mafia dans la politique locale.

Suggested Citation

  • Liza Weinstein, 2008. "Mumbai's Development Mafias: Globalization, Organized Crime and Land Development," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 22-39, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijurrs:v:32:y:2008:i:1:p:22-39
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2427.2008.00766.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 173-202, November.
    2. Scott, James C., 1972. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 91-113, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Chiodelli, 2019. "The illicit side of urban development: Corruption and organised crime in the field of urban planning," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 56(8), pages 1611-1627, June.
    2. Andrew Harris, 2008. "From London to Mumbai and Back Again: Gentrification and Public Policy in Comparative Perspective," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 45(12), pages 2407-2428, November.
    3. Haris Gazdar & Hussain Bux Mallah, 2013. "Informality and Political Violence in Karachi," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 50(15), pages 3099-3115, November.
    4. Richard Ballard & Siân Butcher, 2020. "Comparing the relational work of developers," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 52(2), pages 266-276, March.
    5. Tellman, Beth & Eakin, Hallie & Janssen, Marco A. & de Alba, Felipe & Turner II, B.L., 2021. "The role of institutional entrepreneurs and informal land transactions in Mexico City’s urban expansion," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    6. Damien Vaquier, 2010. "The Impact of Slum Resettlement on Urban Integration in Mumbai: The Case of the Chandivali Project," Working Papers id:2428, eSocialSciences.
    7. João Tonucci, 2023. "PROPERTY‐LED INFORMALITY: Shifting Informal Land Development from Popular Housing to Middle‐Class and Elite Speculation in Belo Horizonte," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 527-545, July.
    8. Anguelovski, Isabelle & Martínez Alier, Joan, 2014. "The ‘Environmentalism of the Poor’ revisited: Territory and place in disconnected glocal struggles," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 167-176.
    9. Nikos Angelos Salingaros, 2021. "Spontaneous Cities: Lessons to Improve Planning for Housing," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-15, May.
    10. Eakin, Hallie & Keele, Svenja & Lueck, Vanessa, 2022. "Uncomfortable knowledge: Mechanisms of urban development in adaptation governance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    11. Andrew Harris, 2012. "The Metonymic Urbanism of Twenty-first-century Mumbai," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 49(13), pages 2955-2973, October.
    12. Louis-Alexandre Berg & Marlon Carranza, 2018. "Organized criminal violence and territorial control," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(5), pages 566-581, September.
    13. Llerena Guiu Searle, 2014. "Conflict and Commensuration: Contested Market Making in India's Private Real Estate Development Sector," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 60-78, January.
    14. Fouillet, Cyril & Guérin, Isabelle & Servet, Jean-Michel, 2021. "Demonetization and digitalization: The Indian government's hidden agenda," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(2).
    15. COLIN McFARLANE, 2008. "Governing the Contaminated City: Infrastructure and Sanitation in Colonial and Post‐Colonial Bombay," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 415-435, June.
    16. Melanie Lombard & Carole Rakodi, 2016. "Urban land conflict in the Global South: Towards an analytical framework," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 53(13), pages 2683-2699, October.
    17. Zhidkova Tatiana, 2015. "Globalization and the Emergence of Violent Non-state Actors: The Case of Human Trafficking," New Global Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, April.
    18. Tandel, Vaidehi & Gandhi, Sahil & Tabarrok, Alex, 2023. "Building networks: Investigating the quid pro quo between local politicians & developers," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    19. Liza Weinstein, 2014. "‘One-Man Handled’: Fragmented Power and Political Entrepreneurship in Globalizing Mumbai," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 14-35, January.

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