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The Value of Information in the Hold-Up Problem

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  • Thomas Pfeiffer

Abstract

In the literature, the information structure of the hold-up problem is typically assumed to be exogenous. In this paper, we introduce an additional stage at which the head office may grant individual divisions access to an information system before they undertake their specific investments. Although more information ceteris paribus enhances each divisions' profits, more information can reduce divisions' investments and destroy synergies for the other division that would have been generated by the investments. If this negative effect dominates, then information can be harmful for the entire company. Hence, information control can be a subtle force to deal with the hold-up problem to a certain extent. In this paper we analyze those conditions under which information is either harmful or beneficial for central management. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Pfeiffer, 2004. "The Value of Information in the Hold-Up Problem," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(2), pages 177-203, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:177-203
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    1. repec:bla:joares:v:22:y:1984:i:1:p:177-191 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    3. repec:bla:joares:v:35:y:1997:i:2:p:273-278 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Jonathan C. Glover & Anil Arya & Shyam NMI Sunder, 1999. "Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm120, Yale School of Management.
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