Information, Selective Disclosure, and Analyst Behavior
"This paper examines whether the prohibition of selective disclosures to equity research analysts mandated by Regulation FD alters the amount of information and the manner in which it is revealed to the market. We demonstrate that equity research analysts are more responsive to information contained in company-initiated disclosures after Reg FD, suggesting that regulation has affected the importance of various channels of communication. We also present evidence consistent with the notion that managers use earnings guidance as a substitute for selective disclosure following the passage of Reg FD." Copyright (c) 2009 Financial Management Association International..
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Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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