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Political Economy And Peel'S Repeal Of The Corn Laws

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  • Douglas A. Irwin

Abstract

The repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain in 1846 has been much debated as to whether interest groups or ideology contributed most to this policy reform. This paper examines a conventional view that Sir Robert Peel, in proposing repeal, converted from protection to free trade under the influence of the ideas of political economy. It is shown that economic ideas had a crucial influence on Peel, but that he remained skeptical of political economy as a doctrine. Copyright 1989 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas A. Irwin, 1989. "Political Economy And Peel'S Repeal Of The Corn Laws," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 41-59, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:41-59
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    Cited by:

    1. William Barnett & Paul A. Samuelson & E. Roy Weintraub, 2005. "Inside the Economist's Mind: The History of Modern Economic Thought, as Explained by Those Who Produced It," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200522, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005.
    2. Hillman, Arye L., 2003. "Trade Liberalization and Globalization: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 3845, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Tena-Junguito, Antonio & Lampe, Markus & Fernandes, Felipe Tâmega, 2012. "How Much Trade Liberalization Was There in the World Before and After Cobden-Chevalier?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(03), pages 708-740, September.
    4. Stephen Meardon, 2007. "Postbellum Protection and Commissioner Wells's Conversion to Free Trade," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, pages 571-604.
    5. Marc Flandreau, 2005. "Home Biases, 19th Century Style," Sciences Po publications n°5398, Sciences Po.
    6. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/670 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Kevin H. O'Rourke, 2002. "Globalization and Inequality: Historical Trends," Aussenwirtschaft, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economics Research, vol. 57(01), pages 65-104, March.
    8. Accominotti, Olivier & Flandreau, Marc, 2005. "Does Bilateralism Promote Trade? Nineteenth Century Liberalization Revisited," CEPR Discussion Papers 5423, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. K. H. O'Rourke & R. Sinnott, 2001. "The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence," Trinity Economics Papers 200110, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.

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