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Determinants Of Environmental Noncompliance By Public Water Systems

Author

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  • TAUHIDUR RAHMAN
  • MINI KOHLI
  • SHARON MEGDAL
  • SATHEESH ARADHYULA
  • JACKIE MOXLEY

Abstract

Whereas a large number of empirical studies have been devoted to analyzing determinants of environmental compliance (EC) by firms, less attention has been paid to EC by public water systems (PWS). To address this gap in the literature, this article uses data on compliance with maximum contaminant levels (MCL) under the Safe Drinking Water Act for 971 PWS in Arizona and identifies the characteristics of PWS that are associated with violation of MCL standards. Three main findings emerge from the analysis. First, larger PWS are more likely to violate MCL standards than smaller PWS. Second, publicly owned PWS have slightly higher probability of violating MCL standards than privately owned systems. Finally, PWS serving residential areas are more likely to violate MCL standards, as opposed to PWS serving school districts or office buildings. The results suggest that for ensuring safe water for people, effectiveness of monitoring policy, and an efficient utilization of resources, the environmental agencies may focus their monitoring and enforcement efforts on these water systems.(JEL K32, Q53)

Suggested Citation

  • Tauhidur Rahman & Mini Kohli & Sharon Megdal & Satheesh Aradhyula & Jackie Moxley, 2010. "Determinants Of Environmental Noncompliance By Public Water Systems," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(2), pages 264-274, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:28:y:2010:i:2:p:264-274
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2009.00150.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anabela Botelho & Lígia M. Costa Pinto & Isabel Rodrigues, 2005. "How To Comply With Environmental Regulations? The Role Of Information," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(4), pages 568-577, October.
    2. Oljaca, Neda & Keeler, Andrew G & Dorfman, Jeffrey, 1998. "Penalty Functions for Environmental Violations: Evidence from Water Quality Enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 255-264, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anabela Botelho, 2012. "An empirical analysis of the factors influencing compliance with healthcare waste management regulations," NIMA Working Papers 46, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho.
    2. W. Kip Viscusi & Joel Huber & Jason Bell, 2015. "The Private Rationality Of Bottled Water Drinking," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(3), pages 450-467, July.
    3. Anabela Botelho, 2013. "The impact of regulatory compliance behavior on hazardous waste generation in European private healthcare facilities," NIMA Working Papers 49, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho.
    4. Fu, Guanlong & Liu, Pengfei & Swallow, Stephen K., 2020. "Effectiveness of Public versus Private Ownership: Violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 291-320, August.
    5. Khanal, Nabin Babu & Elbakidze, Levan, 2023. "Per-and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in Drinking Water: Evaluation of exposure in the US," 2023 Annual Meeting, July 23-25, Washington D.C. 336001, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    6. Dobbin, Kristin B. & Fencl, Amanda L., 2021. "Institutional diversity and safe drinking water provision in the United States," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

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