IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/buecrs/v55y2003i1p37-52.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Balestrino
  • Umberto Galmarini

Abstract

Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether the presence of imperfect income tax compliance affects the optimal provision of public goods within a framework in which public expenditure is financed by a general income tax that also accomplishes redistributive goals. We first derive the income tax structure, and then a generalized Samuelson rule. We argue that, under imperfect income tax compliance, it is desirable to distort public–good supply downwards, in the sense that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public and private consumption must exceed their marginal rate of transformation.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Balestrino & Umberto Galmarini, 2003. "Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 37-52, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:55:y:2003:i:1:p:37-52
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8586.00161
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00161
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1467-8586.00161?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Falkinger, Josef, 1991. "On optimal public good provision with tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 127-133, June.
    2. Agell, Jonas & Persson, Mats, 2000. "Tax arbitrage and labor supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 3-24, October.
    3. Joel Slemrod, 2001. "A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(2), pages 119-128, March.
    4. Vidar Christiansen, 1981. "Evaluation of Public Projects under Optimal Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(3), pages 447-457.
    5. Gaube, Thomas, 2000. "When do distortionary taxes reduce the optimal supply of public goods?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 151-180, May.
    6. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    7. Cowell, F A, 1990. "Tax Sheltering and the Cost of Evasion," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 231-243, January.
    8. Nava, M. & Schroyen, F. & Marchand, M., 1996. "Optimal fiscal and public expenditure policy in a two-class economy," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1231, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Nava, Mario & Schroyen, Fred & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Optimal fiscal and public expenditure policy in a two-class economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 119-137, July.
    10. Schroyen, Fred, 1997. "Pareto efficient income taxation under costly monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 343-366, September.
    11. Agell, Jonas & Persson, Mats, 2000. "Tax arbitrage and labor supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 3-24, October.
    12. Cowell, Frank A., 1985. "Tax evasion with labour income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 19-34, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Balestrino, Alessandro, 2010. "Tax avoidance and the endogenous formation of social norms," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 601-609, October.
    2. Francesco Reito & Salvatore Spagano, 2017. "Joint liability taxation and group auditing," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(2), pages 305-327, August.
    3. Alessandro Balestrino, "undated". "Tax Avoidance, Endogenous Social Norms, and the Comparison Income Effect," EPRU Working Paper Series 05-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Dec 2005.
    4. Laszlo Goerke, 2007. "Corporate and personal income tax declarations," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(3), pages 281-292, June.
    5. Alessandro Balestrino, 2012. "Kind of Black: The Musicians' Labour Market in Italy," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 26(4), pages 472-491, December.
    6. Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009. "Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 897-926, December.
    7. Traxler, Christian, 2012. "Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 1-9.
    8. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Sugata Marjit & Santiago Pinto & Marcel Thum, 2025. "Taxation, Compliance, and Clandestine Activities," Working Papers 2025-005, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    9. Alessandro Balestrino & Umberto Galmarini, 2005. "On the Redistributive Properties of Presumptive Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1381, CESifo.
    10. James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2010. "An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs," MPRA Paper 26106, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas Gaube, 2005. "Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Provision Rules vs. Provision Level," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(3), pages 319-334, May.
    2. Thomas Gaube, 2005. "Public Investment and Income Taxation: Redistribution vs. Productive Performance," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 86(1), pages 1-18, October.
    3. James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2010. "An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs," MPRA Paper 26106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Felix Bierbrauer, 2006. "Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_6, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    5. Wladislaw Mill & Cornelius Schneider, 2023. "The Bright Side of Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 10615, CESifo.
    6. Reinhard Neck & Jens Wächter & Friedrich Schneider, 2012. "Tax avoidance versus tax evasion: on some determinants of the shadow economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(1), pages 104-117, February.
    7. Kalina Koleva, 2005. "A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r05050, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    8. Agell, Jonas & Persson, Mats & Sacklén, Hans, 1999. "Labour Supply Prediction When Tax Avoidance Matters," Seminar Papers 679, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    9. Gauthier, Stéphane & Laroque, Guy, 2009. "Separability and public finance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1168-1174, December.
    10. Firouz Gahvari & Luca Micheletto, 2020. "Wage endogeneity, tax evasion, and optimal nonlinear income taxation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 501-531, June.
    11. Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen, 2016. "Indirect taxes for redistribution: Should necessity goods be favored?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 64-88.
    12. Johannes Lorenz, 2019. "Population dynamics of tax avoidance with crowding effects," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 581-609, April.
    13. Felix Bierbrauer, 2008. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    14. Duccio Gamannossi degl’Innocenti & Matthew D. Rablen, 2017. "Tax avoidance and optimal income tax enforcement," IFS Working Papers W17/08, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    15. Jesper Roine, 2006. "The political economics of not paying taxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 107-134, January.
    16. Agell, Jonas & Persson, Mats & Sacklén, Hans, 1999. "Labor Supply When Tax Avoidance Matters," Working Paper Series 157, Trade Union Institute for Economic Research.
    17. Schroyen, Fred, 1997. "Pareto efficient income taxation under costly monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 343-366, September.
    18. Pántya, József & Kovács, Judit & Kogler, Christoph & Kirchler, Erich, 2016. "Work performance and tax compliance in flat and progressive tax systems," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 262-273.
    19. Agell, Jonas & Persson, Mats & Sacklen, Hans, 2004. "The effects of tax reform on labor supply, tax revenue and welfare when tax avoidance matters," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 963-982, November.
    20. Liqun Liu, 2006. "Combining Distributional Weights and the Marginal Cost of Funds," Public Finance Review, , vol. 34(1), pages 60-79, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:55:y:2003:i:1:p:37-52. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0307-3378 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.