Tax Sheltering and the Cost of Evasion
The cost-of-evasion function is derived within a model of utility-maximizing taxpayers. The behavior of this cost in response to tax rates, enforcement paraters, income, and risk aversion is analyzed. The function is used to analyze the behavior of individuals in circumstances where there are opportunities for tax sheltering as well as tax evasion. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 42 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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