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On Indirect Reciprocity

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  • Jan Tullberg

Abstract

. Indirect reciprocity, defined as a beneficial act whose return comes from someone other than the act's recipient, is a common phenomenon in human societies. However, it is a poorly analyzed phenomenon with respect to payoffs. Are the expectations of return realistic, or not? Are these expectations pro‐social attitudes, or illusions induced through manipulation? I discuss four categories of putative indirect reciprocity, two of which pertain to interaction between individuals and two of which involve social systems. The conclusion is that two of these categories, reciprocal reputation and institutionalized reciprocity, are strongly linked to reciprocity, whereas the other two categories, generous reputation and metaphysical reward, are likely to involve only an element of illusionary reciprocity and a substantial degree of altruism.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Tullberg, 2004. "On Indirect Reciprocity," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(5), pages 1193-1212, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:63:y:2004:i:5:p:1193-1212
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00341.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2022. "Altruism and Strategic Courage. Inside Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma," Working Papers hal-03684249, HAL.
    2. Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2020. "Altruism, predation and the Samaritan's dilemma," Working Papers hal-02550432, HAL.
    3. Alain Marciano, 2014. "Exploitation, Mutual Advantage and The Myth of the Samaritan's Dilemma," ICER Working Papers 10-2014, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    4. Fanelli Luca & Paruolo Paolo, 2006. "Exchange rates, prices and their speed of adjustment," Economics and Quantitative Methods qf0607, Department of Economics, University of Insubria.
    5. John Braithwaite & Seung‐Hun Hong, 2015. "The iteration deficit in responsive regulation: Are regulatory ambassadors an answer?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(1), pages 16-29, March.

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