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The Laws of Economic Rent and Property:

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  • Cyrus Bina

Abstract

Economic rent in general, and oil rent in particular, is an historically‐specific, social category, reflective of unique property relations, which goes beyond the conventional notion of physical scarcity prevailing in economics literature Neither the Ricardian theory nor the neoclassical general equilibrium theory suitably explain the nature of the capital‐land relation and convey an understanding of the priority of their mutual interaction within the production process Being an effect of specific property relation, the phenomenon of rent merely assumes the status of a special category applicable to the concrete conditions of some industries Hence, political economy lacks a general theory of rent The concept of oil rent is based on the potentially conflicting interaction of ownership of oil reserves, and that of the oil leases, within the global oil industry The oil rent is the result of the transformation of the existing differential productivities of oil‐producing regions within the global oil industry The formation of global oil prices and differential oil rents rest on the global competition which has become a distinguishing feature of this industry since the early 1970s

Suggested Citation

  • Cyrus Bina, 1992. "The Laws of Economic Rent and Property:," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 187-204, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:51:y:1992:i:2:p:187-204
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1992.tb03347.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John A. Hobson, 1891. "The Law of the Three Rents," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 5(3), pages 263-288.
    2. John B. Clark, 1891. "Distribution as Determined by a Law of Rent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 5(3), pages 289-318.
    3. Brown, Gardner, Jr, 1974. "An Optimal Program for Managing Common Property Resources with Congestion Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 163-173, Jan.-Feb..
    4. Bina, Cyrus, 1989. "Competition, control and price formation in the international energy industry," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 162-168, July.
    5. Clark, John Bates, 1890. "Distribution as Determined by a Law of Rent," History of Economic Thought Articles, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, vol. 5.
    6. Devarajan, Shantayanan & Fisher, Anthony C, 1982. "Exploration and Scarcity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1279-1290, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Franklin Obeng†Odoom, 2018. "Transnational Corporations and Urban Development," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(2), pages 447-510, March.
    2. de Carvalho, Joaquim Francisco & Mercedes, Sonia Seger P. & Sauer, Ildo L., 2010. "Precautionary principle, economic and energy systems and social equity," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(10), pages 5399-5402, October.
    3. Franklin Obeng‐Odoom, 2021. "Oil Cities in Africa: Beyond Just Transition," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(2), pages 777-821, March.
    4. Robert Wade & Geraint Ellis, 2022. "Reclaiming the Windy Commons: Landownership, Wind Rights, and the Assetization of Renewable Resources," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(10), pages 1-31, May.

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