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Interlocking Corporate Directorships as a Social Network

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  • Thomas Koenig
  • Robert Gogel

Abstract

. Outside directors are now a majority on the boards of the‘Fortune 500’corporations creating a network of interconnections through interlocking directorates. Details of this phenomenon and explanations for its significance can be found in an earlier article in this Journal*. This network can be visualized as a system through which common norms, values, and a sense of “weness” can flow. This sense of being part of a corporate establishment would have significant effects on corporate conduct. From what top corporate leaders say and do, the validity and implications of this hypothesis are examined. This class hegemony theory views power as shared within a system of social relationships, in contrast to the management control theory which considers management as in total control.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Koenig & Robert Gogel, 1981. "Interlocking Corporate Directorships as a Social Network," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 37-50, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:40:y:1981:i:1:p:37-50
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1981.tb01370.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen Chen & David K. Ding & William R. Wilson, 2021. "The Old Boys Club in New Zealand Listed Companies," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(8), pages 1-21, July.
    2. Kambar Farooq & Muhammad Azeem & Chin Man Chui & Jun (Tony) Ruan, 2023. "Board Connections and Dividend Policy," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 59(4), pages 983-1040, December.
    3. Erik Devos & Andrew Prevost & John Puthenpurackal, 2009. "Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 38(4), pages 861-887, December.
    4. Chen Hao & Xuegang Feng & Dandan Wu & Xiaodong Guo, 2024. "Board interlocks and corporate risk-taking: An empirical analysis of listed companies from tourism and related industries in China," Tourism Economics, , vol. 30(1), pages 174-211, February.
    5. Michael C. Withers & Michael D. Howard & Laszlo Tihanyi, 2020. "You’ve Got a Friend: Examining Board Interlock Formation After Financial Restatements," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(3), pages 742-769, May.
    6. Jana Oehmichen & Marc Steffen & Michael Wolff, 2010. "Der Einfluss der Aufsichtsratszusammensetzung auf die Präsenz von Frauen in Aufsichtsräten," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 62(5), pages 503-532, August.
    7. Christine Mallin & Giovanna Michelon & Davide Raggi, 2013. "Monitoring Intensity and Stakeholders’ Orientation: How Does Governance Affect Social and Environmental Disclosure?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 114(1), pages 29-43, April.
    8. Carroll, William K. & Sapinski, Jean Philippe, 2017. "Corporate elites and intercorporate networks," SocArXiv 43w7s, Center for Open Science.
    9. Suzette Viviers & Nadia Mans-Kemp, 2019. "Director overboardedness in South Africa: evaluating the experience and busyness hypotheses," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 16(1), pages 68-81, March.
    10. Światowiec-Szczepańska, Justyna & Małys, Łukasz, 2021. "Board Interlocks as a Diffusion of Strategic Information – Does it Work? A Polish Case," Journal of East European Management Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 26(4), pages 589-616.
    11. Ludovico Alcorta, 1986. "Perspectivas de la centralización económica: un balance bibliográfico," Apuntes. Revista de ciencias sociales, Fondo Editorial, Universidad del Pacífico, vol. 13(19), pages 3-51.
    12. Beng Wee Goh & Jimmy Lee & Jeffrey Ng & Kevin Ow Yong, 2016. "The Effect of Board Independence on Information Asymmetry," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(1), pages 155-182, May.
    13. Zhao, Tianjiao, 2021. "Board network, investment efficiency, and the mediating role of CSR: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 897-919.
    14. Sapinski, Jean Philippe & Carroll, William K., 2017. "Interlocking directorates and corporate networks," SocArXiv 7t8c9, Center for Open Science.
    15. Atanasko Atanasovski, 2012. "Impact of Cross-listed Directorship on Appointment and Independence of Auditors: Evidence from Republic of Macedonia," Acta Universitatis Danubius. OEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 4(4), pages 76-82, August.

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