Political Connection and the Executive-employee Pay Gap: An Institutional Economics Perspective

Increasingly huge executive-employee pay gap has attracted wide attention, hence it is therefore crucial to control it at a reasonable level. Using a sample of 23,563 firm-year observations in China covering 2010-2021, we examine the U-shape relationship between the political connection, an informal institution, and the executive-employee pay gap. The U-curve reveals that political connections are beneficial whereas excessive can be harmful, and the best measure controlling the executive-employee pay gap is to keep political connections between the district level and the city level. Under different institutional environments, on the one hand, firms with higher percentages of overseas experienced CEOs are more motivated to narrow the pay gap and promote equity, on the other hand, media attention could also help reduce the pay gap, especially for traditional newspaper media. Our findings have important implications for the local government that rational political connection helps reduce excessive executive-employee pay inequity, as well as the significant role of media by creating an open and permissive environment.