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An Analysis of Repayment Among Clients of the Microfinance Institution Esperanza International, Dominican Republic

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  • Salazar, Gabriela L.

Abstract

This research considers default among borrowers of Esperanza International, a microfinance institution in the Dominican Republic. Though Esperanza holds high repayment rates, it is of value to examine the 3 to 5 percent of clients that have not had success with the program. If success is defined as repayment and can be correlated with socio‐economic characteristics, it may point towards the development of remedial programs and/or interventions. In coordination with organizational interests, this study examines 15,104 loans divided amongst 8,991 borrowers between April 2005 and October 2007. Default for each loan (defined as the failure to repay any quota for 120 days) is considered against gender, marital status, number of dependents, level of education, age, size of loan, type of microenterprise, and regional office. Results of a first linear regression indicate that regional office is most important among included variables. This is followed by education, gender, and marital status ‐ with women, those with less education, and those classified as cohabitating defaulting less often. A second linear regression indicates that an alternate categorical division of microenterprise does not improve the variable’s significance. Two final regressions consider default separately among borrowers that were and were not identified as Dominican‐Haitian. These results showed that Dominican‐Haitians defaulted least often when widowed or married, and defaulted most often at the Santo Domingo office. Overall these results call for further investigation, particularly into dissimilarities among Esperanza’s various branches.

Suggested Citation

  • Salazar, Gabriela L., 2008. "An Analysis of Repayment Among Clients of the Microfinance Institution Esperanza International, Dominican Republic," SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 2008, pages 1-25.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:ssaaea:113231
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.113231
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alexander Tedeschi, Gwendolyn, 2006. "Here today, gone tomorrow: Can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 84-105, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ibtissem Baklouti, 2013. "Determinants of Microcredit Repayment: The Case of Tunisian Microfinance Bank," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 25(3), pages 370-382, September.
    2. Toyin Segun Ogunleye, 2017. "Financial Inclusion and the Role of Women in Nigeria," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 29(2), pages 249-258, June.
    3. Bilau, José & St-Pierre, Josée, 2018. "Microcredit repayment in a European context: evidence from Portugal," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 85-96.
    4. Salvador Cruz Rambaud & Joaquín López Pascual & Emilio M. Santandreu, 2023. "A socioeconomic approach to the profile of microcredit holders from the Hispanic minority in the USA," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, December.

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