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Oddziaływanie regulacyjne Unii Europejskiej na rynek usług telekomunikacyjnych

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  • Czaplewski, Maciej

Abstract

The article assesses the impact of EU regulations and policies on the emergence of a competitive telecommunications market in the European Union. The author seeks to answer two research questions: (i) Has the model of opening the EU’s telecommunications services market to competition proved to be effective in practice? (ii) Has the EU delivered on its plan to create a competitive telecommunications market in Europe? The author uses research methods including a critical review of studies on the subject. He also examines the nature of the regulatory measures in question and explains why the EU telecommunications services market needs adjustment. Czaplewski conducts a cause-and-effect analysis to show the link between specific regulations and their socioeconomic implications. The author also carries out a synthesis based on a comprehensive evaluation of EU regulatory policies affecting the telecommunications services market and highlights key policy dilemmas. The research establishes that the liberalization of the EU’s telecommunications services market has put an end to a telecommunications monopoly and old regulatory structures. Deregulation has created and strengthened competition in telecommunications services for end customers. However, efforts to foster competition in wholesale access to the network for new telecommunications operators have produced less spectacular results, Czaplewski says. The author concludes that the model adopted by the EU for opening its telecommunications services market to competition has only been partially successful. Another conclusion is that efforts to create competition on the telecommunications services market are still far from complete. Czaplewski also argues that greater competition in wholesale access to the telecommunications network should be an important objective of EU regulatory policy on the telecommunications services market.

Suggested Citation

  • Czaplewski, Maciej, 2015. "Oddziaływanie regulacyjne Unii Europejskiej na rynek usług telekomunikacyjnych," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2015(5), October.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:polgne:359019
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.359019
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