IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ags/ersfer/335322.html

De la chandelle aux ventes informatisées. L’organisation des ventes aux enchères de bois des forêts publiques, entre gouvernement des intérêts privés et souci de l’intérêt général (1318-2020)

Author

Listed:
  • Marty, Gérard

Abstract

This article focuses on analyzing the shaping of commercial exchange built by public authorities in public timber auctions over the past seven centuries, in order to govern the economic conduct of agents. It describes the succession of the three auction procedures used by the forestry to sell its timber lots. It highlights that the use of these procedures corresponds to three different timescales, whose emergence and disappearance are linked to the action of endogenous and exogenous variables. Finally, it demonstrates that the current choice of the National Forests Office (ONF) to exclusively use the tendering process results from a complex arbitration between its interests and those of the forest-wood sector, to which it must ensure a competitive timber supply.

Suggested Citation

  • Marty, Gérard, 2020. "De la chandelle aux ventes informatisées. L’organisation des ventes aux enchères de bois des forêts publiques, entre gouvernement des intérêts privés et souci de l’intérêt général (1318-2020)," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 373(July-Sept).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ersfer:335322
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.335322
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/335322/files/economierurale-8012.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.335322?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(1), pages 29-50.
    2. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011. "Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vivek Bhattacharya & James W. Roberts & Andrew Sweeting, 2014. "Regulating bidder participation in auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 675-704, December.
    2. Fang, Hanming & Tang, Xun, 2014. "Inference of bidders’ risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 180(2), pages 198-216.
    3. Matthew Gentry & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu, 2015. "Identification and estimation in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry," CeMMAP working papers CWP16/15, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    4. Mehmet Ali Soytaş & Damla Durak Uşar, 2017. "Role of Strategic Interactions in Corporate Sustainability Decisions: An Empirical Investigation," Ekonomi-tek - International Economics Journal, Turkish Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 17-46, January.
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
    6. Könnyű, Nóra & Tóth, Sándor F., 2013. "A cutting plane method for solving harvest scheduling models with area restrictions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 236-248.
    7. Jun Ma & Vadim Marmer & Artyom Shneyerov & Pai Xu, 2021. "Monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first-price auctions," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(10), pages 944-982, November.
    8. Matthew Gentry & Tong Li, 2012. "Identification in auctions with selective entry," CeMMAP working papers 38/12, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    9. Nianqing Liu & Yao Luo, 2017. "A Nonparametric Test For Comparing Valuation Distributions In First‐Price Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(3), pages 857-888, August.
    10. Elena Krasnokutskaya & Katja Seim, 2011. "Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2653-2686, October.
    11. Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2023. "Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 815-851.
    12. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    13. Atmaca, Sümeyra & Schoors, Koen & Podkolzina, Elena, 2025. "Corrupt reserve prices," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 90(PB).
    14. de Leverano, Adriano, 2019. "Collusion through market sharing agreements: Evidence from Quebec's road paving market," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-053, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    15. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
    16. Zhongmin Wang & Minbo Xu, 2016. "Empirical Evidence on Competition and Revenue in an All-Pay Contest," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(3), pages 429-448, November.
    17. Yunmi Kong, 2020. "Not knowing the competition: evidence and implications for auction design," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 840-867, September.
    18. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011. "Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
    19. Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2013. "What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 176(1), pages 46-58.
    20. Yixin Lu & Alok Gupta & Wolfgang Ketter & Eric van Heck, 2019. "Information Transparency in Business-to-Business Auction Markets: The Role of Winner Identity Disclosure," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4261-4279, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:ersfer:335322. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sferrea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.