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Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Mougeot

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Florence Naegelen

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

[fre] Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique. . Cet article examine le phénomène de la malédiction du vainqueur dans les procédures d'appel d'offres. Un modèle de simulation permet de distinguer la malédiction (due à une erreur d'évaluation a priori de la valeur du bien mis en vente) et le regret ex-post (dû à une comparaison entre la valeur ex-post et la valeur a priori). On montre qu'une stratégie optimale permet d'éviter la malédiction sans éliminer la possibilité d'un regret. [eng] Economc rationality and the winner's curse . . In this paper, we study the phenomenon known as the « winner's curse » in common value auction models. A simulation model allows to distinguish between the winner's curse (consequence of an a priori error on the expected value of the item) and the post decision surprise (when the a posteriori profit is compared with the a priori profit). We show that an optimal strategy can avoid the winner's curse but not all possibilities of regret.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique," Post-Print hal-02503659, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02503659
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    2. Marty, Gérard, 2020. "De la chandelle aux ventes informatisées. L’organisation des ventes aux enchères de bois des forêts publiques, entre gouvernement des intérêts privés et souci de l’intérêt général (1318-2020)," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 373(July-Sept).

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