ITQs and Community: An Essay on Environmental Governance
Two important new directions in resource and environmental management are increased reliance on market mechanisms on the one hand, and on greater participation by local communities on the other. In fisheries, market-based management is found mainly in the "cap-and-trade" systems known as individual transferable quotas (ITQs). ITQs are effective in achieving certain economic goals but often with undesirable social costs, leading to the view that they are antithetical to community-based management. However, ITQ systems have been adapted to mitigate community losses. In addition, social resistance to ITQs has encouraged the development of innovative programs in community-based fisheries management.
Volume (Year): 33 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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