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Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina's long-run decline

Author

Listed:
  • Leandro Prados de la Escosura

    () (Historia Economica e Instituciones and Instituto Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid, 126, Getafe, 28903 Madrid, Spain.)

  • Isabel Sanz-Villarroya

    () (Estructura Economica, Economia Publica e Historia Economica,Universidad de Zaragoza, Gran Via 2, Zaragoza, Spain.)

Abstract

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s “contract intensive money” (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline.

Suggested Citation

  • Leandro Prados de la Escosura & Isabel Sanz-Villarroya, 2009. "Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina's long-run decline," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 3(1), pages 1-26, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:afc:cliome:v:3:y:2009:i:1:p:1-26
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jorge Niosi, 2014. "The construction of national systems of innovation: a comparative analysis of Argentina and Canada," Chapters,in: National Innovation Systems, Social Inclusion and Development, chapter 12, pages 349-379 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Gerard Russo & Jaclyn R.K. Lindo & Sang-Hyop Lee & Rui Wang & Thamana Lekprichakul & Abdul Jabbar, 2012. "The Impact of State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) Expansion on Health Insurance Coverage in Hawaii," Working Papers 201208, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    3. Prados de la Escosura, Leandro & Rosés, Joan R. & Villarroya, Isabel Sanz, 2010. "Stabilization and Growth under Dictatorship: The Experience of Franco's Spain," CEPR Discussion Papers 7731, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. David Greasley & Les Oxley, 2010. "Cliometrics And Time Series Econometrics: Some Theory And Applications," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(5), pages 970-1042, December.
    5. Henry Willebald, 2014. "Land-abundance, frontier expansion and the hypothesis of appropriability revisited from an historical perspective: settler economies during the First Globalization," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 14-14, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    6. Campos, Nauro F & Karanasos, Menelaos G. & Tan, Bin, 2014. "From Riches to Rags, and Back? Institutional Change, Financial Development and Economic Growth in Argentina since the 1890s," IZA Discussion Papers 8654, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Ryan A. Compton & Daniel C. Giedeman & Noel D. Johnson, 2010. "Investing In Institutions," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 419-445, November.
    8. Sebastián Fleitas & Andrés Rius & Carolina Román & Henry Willebald, 2013. "Contract enforcement, investment and growth in Uruguay since 1870," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 13-01, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    9. Aboal, Diego & Noya, Nelson & Rius, Andrés, 2014. "Contract Enforcement and Investment: A Systematic Review of the Evidence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 322-338.
    10. Campos, Nauro F. & Karanasos, Menelaos G. & Tan, Bin, 2012. "Two to tangle: Financial development, political instability and economic growth in Argentina," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 290-304.
    11. González, Germán & Viego, Valentina, 2009. "Argentina-Canada from 1870: Explaining the dynamics of divergence," MPRA Paper 18394, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Emilio Ocampo, 2015. "Commodity Price Booms and Populist Cycles. An Explanation of Argentina’s Decline in the 20th Century," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 562, Universidad del CEMA.
    13. Alan Dye & Sumner La Croix, 2012. "The Political Economy of Land Privatization in Argentina and Australia, 1810-1850," Working Papers 201207, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contract intensive money; Economic decline; Argentina;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • N16 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • N26 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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