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Hegemony and International Alignment

Author

Listed:
  • Fernando Broner
  • Alberto Martin
  • Josefin Meyer
  • Christoph Trebesch
  • Jiaxian Zhou Wu

Abstract

This article explores the interplay between economic hegemony and political alignment. Using theoretical and empirical insights from Broner et al. (2024), we posit that hegemonic states, like the United States, foster political alignment, which enhances globalization. We use UN voting data to proxy for international alignment and show that hegemons induce alignment. These data have shortcomings, however. UN voting only covers the post-WWII period, refers to a narrow set of issues, and displays little time variation. As for military alliances, they were not widely used before the mid-twentieth century. We propose an alternative measure of alignment based on international treaties.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Josefin Meyer & Christoph Trebesch & Jiaxian Zhou Wu, 2025. "Hegemony and International Alignment," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 115, pages 593-598, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:115:y:2025:p:593-98
    DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20251041
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law

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