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Towards an Interest-Free Islamic Economic System نحو نظام اقتصادي لاربوي إسلامي

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  • W AQAR MASOOD KHAN

    (Chief Economist and Vice President Bankers Equity Limited, Karachi, Pakistan)

Abstract

Rigorous mathematical techniques are used to compare the Islamic financial system based on variable return scheme (VRS) with the traditional one based on fixed return scheme (FRS). It is shown, under certain assumptions which include risk aversion on the part of investors, that the Pareto optimal contract is the VRS. Also VRS spreads risks more evenly than FRS allowing more risk taking in the economy. The domination of the real world by FRS, i.e. debts contracts, is shown to be caused mainly by informational asymmetry and higher monitoring Costs in case of VRS. But these costs are not prohibitive. The more effective the methods of monitoring and the higher the level of honesty on the part of economic agents, the more superior the Islamic financial system would prove to be in practice. يستخدم البحث أدوات التحليل الرياضي المتعمقة ليقارن نظاماً مالياً إسلامياً تتم فيه عقود التمويل على أساس متحول (أي بالمشاركة بحصة من الربح) مع نظام تقليدي تتم عقوده على أساس عائد ثابت (أي بالاقتراض بفائدة ربوية). ويعتمد البحث على افتراضات معينة منها افتراض كراهية المستثمرين للمخاطرة ليبرهن على أن العقود التي تحقق أمثلية باريتو (أي تحقق الكفاءة الاقتصادية) هي عقود المشاركة بحصة من الربح. وتمتاز هذه العقود أيضاً بأنها توزع المخاطر على نطاق واسع مما يشجع على تحمل المخاطر الاقتصادية عموماً. ويفسر البحث الانتشار الواسع لعقود الاقراض بفائدة بأنه يعود إلى عدم تكافؤ المعلومات بين طرفي عقد التمويل، ولسبب ارتفاع تكاليف الرقابة في عقود المشاركة. على أن هذا الارتفاع لا يبلغ درجة مانعة. وكلما ازدادت فاعلية وسائل الرقابة وارتفع مستوى الأمانة لدى رجال الأعمال كلما ظهر تفوق نظام التمويل الإسلامي عملياً.

Suggested Citation

  • W Aqar Masood Khan, 1989. "Towards an Interest-Free Islamic Economic System نحو نظام اقتصادي لاربوي إسلامي," Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Islamic Economics Institute., vol. 1(1), pages 3-38, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:abd:kauiea:v:1:y:1989:i:1:no:1:p:3-38
    DOI: 10.4197/islec.1-1.1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1982. "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 107-140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
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    4. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1972. "Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Take-Overs," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(2), pages 458-482, Autumn.
    5. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Khadidja Khaldi & Amina Hamdouni, 2018. "Islamic Financial Intermediation Compared to Ribaoui Financial Intermediation: A Theoretical and Mathematical Analysis," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 8(3), pages 268-283.

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