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Corporate deductibility provisions and managerial incentives

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  • Koethenbuerger, Marko
  • Stimmelmayr, Michael

Abstract

Using an agency model of firm behavior, the paper analyzes whether the cost of investment should be tax exempt. The findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is tax deductible, as commonly advocated. The extent to which the return on investment should be taxed depends on how the internal provision of incentive pay and external monitoring by banks interact in constraining the manager and whether retained earnings or new share issues finance investments at the margin. The results are informative for the design of investment subsidies which might be integrated in corporate tax systems such as an Allowance for Corporate Equity or a cash-flow tax.

Suggested Citation

  • Koethenbuerger, Marko & Stimmelmayr, Michael, 2014. "Corporate deductibility provisions and managerial incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 120-130.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:111:y:2014:i:c:p:120-130
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Pablo Gutierrez & Ramon E. Lopez & Eugenio Figueroa, 2014. "Local neutrality of Corporate Tax systems," Working Papers wp394, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    2. Brekke, Kurt R. & Garcia Pires, Armando J. & Schindler, Dirk & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2017. "Capital taxation and imperfect competition: ACE vs. CBIT," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 1-15.
    3. Hebous, Shafik & Ruf, Martin, 2017. "Evaluating the effects of ACE systems on multinational debt financing and investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 131-149.
    4. Robert Krämer & Vilen Lipatov, 2013. "The Effect of Corporate Taxation and Ownership on Raising Shareholder Capital," CESifo Working Paper Series 4436, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Peter Egger & Marko Koethenbuerger, 2016. "Hosting multinationals: Economic and fiscal implications," Aussenwirtschaft, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economics Research, vol. 67(01), pages 45-69, February.
    6. repec:spr:busres:v:11:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s40685-017-0054-y is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate taxation; Investment subsidies; Corporate governance; Delegated monitoring; Incentive contract;

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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