International Journal of Game Theory

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Series handle: repec:spr:jogath

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1991, Volume 20, Issue 2

• 183-90 On the Symmetric and Weighted Shapley Values
  by Chun, Youngsub

• 1-11 Bisection Property of the Kernel
  by Chang, Chih
• 13-22 On the Strong Monotonicity of Power Indices
  by Sagonti, Emanuela
• 23-32 Saddle Point Theorems
  by Radzik, Tadeusz
• 33-51 Optimal Strategies for the Uniformed Player
  by Heuer, Martin
• 53-63 On Non-transferable Utility Games with Coalition Structure
  by Winter, Eyal
• 65-90 Games of Bounded Deviation, Additivizations of Games and Asymptotic Martingales
  by Armstrong, Thomas E

• 329-38 On Finding the Nucleolus of an N-Person Cooperative Game
  by Sankaran, Jayaram K
• 339-51 An Axiomatization of the Weighted NTU Value
  by Levy, Anat & McLean, Richard P
• 353-63 Quasi-values on Subspaces
  by Gilboa, Itzhak & Monderer, Dov
• 365-73 An Axiomatization of the Nucleolus
  by Potters, Jos A M
• 375-405 On a Duel with Time Lag and Arbitrary Accuracy Functions
  by Kurisu, Tadashi
• 407-11 A Weak Monotonicity Property of the Nucleolus
  by Zhou, Lin
• 413-20 Characterization of Cores of Assignment Games
  by Quint, Thomas
• 421-30 On the Convexity of Communication Games
  by van den Nouweland, Anne & Borm, Peter
• 431-56 Internal Correlation in Repeated Games
  by Lehrer, Ehud

• 237-67 Perfect Equilibria in Simultaneous-Offers Bargaining
  by Chatterjee, Kalyan & Samuelson, Larry
• 269-76 Strategy Additions and Equilibrium Selections
  by Samuelson, Larry
• 277-86 Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in N-Person Games
  by Powers, Imelda Yeung
• 287-99 How Characteristic Are Characteristic Functions?
  by Kolpin, Van
• 301-24 A Local Theory of Cooperative Games
  by Yano, Makoto

• 111-27 The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results
  by Le Breton, M & Salles, M
• 129-38 Entropy Control Costs and Entropic Equilibria
  by Stahl, D O
• 139-52 Comparative Cooperative Game Theory
  by Ichiishi, T
• 153-69 The Egalitarian Solution and Reduced Game Properties in Convex Games
  by Dutta, B
• 171-90 Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games without Side Payments
  by Moldovanu, B
• 191-217 Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information
  by Lehrer, E
• 219-32 Cores and Large Cores When Population Varies
  by Moulin, H

• 1-9 NP-Completeness of Some Problems Concerning Voting Games
  by Prasad, K & Kelly, J S
• 11-16 A Remark on Myerson's Concept of Proper Equilibrium
  by Jurado, I Garcia & Prada Sanchez, J M
• 17-31 Values for Two-Stage Games: Another View of the Shapley Axioms
  by Beja, A & Gilboa, Itzhak
• 33-44 On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games
  by Basu, Kaushik
• 45-57 Monotonicity of the Core and Value in Dynamic Cooperative Games
  by Rosenthal, E C
• 59-89 "Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties
  by Nachbar, J H
• 91-100 Threat Bargaining Games with a Variable Population
  by Lahiri, Sajal
• 101-06 Finite Approximations to a Zero-Sum Game with Incomplete Information
  by Mamer, J W & Schilling, K E

• 361-88 Limit Properties of Power Indices in a Class of Representative Systems
  by Muto, S
• 389-407 The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games
  by Maschler, M & Owen, G
• 409-21 Incentive Compatible Strategies for General Stackelberg Games with Incomplete Information
  by Page, F H, Jr
• 423-31 Non-cooperative Matching Games
  by Kamecke, U
• 433-69 Homogeneous Games as Anti Step Functions
  by Sudholter, P
• 471-76 A Note on a Theorem of Aumann and Dreze [Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures]
  by Moldovanu, B

• 247-59 Nonconvexity in Noncooperative Game Theory
  by Kostreva, M M
• 261-72 A Note on Polymatrix Games
  by Quintas, L G
• 273-91 A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games
  by Rosenthal, Robert W
• 293-310 On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States
  by Vrieze, O J & Thuijsman, F
• 311-20 A Note on Periodicity in Some Octal Games
  by Gangolli, A & Plambeck, T
• 321-25 Weighted Majority Games Have Many u-Values
  by Monderer, D
• 327-38 Geodetic Contraction Games on Graphs
  by Fraenkel, A S & Harary, F
• 339-56 Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space
  by Owen, G & Shapley, L S

• 125-39 The Space of Conditional Systems is a Ball
  by McLennan, Andrew
• 141-74 Consistent Conditional Systems in Noncooperative Game Theory
  by McLennan, Andrew
• 175-84 Fixed Points of Contractible Valued Correspondences
  by McLennan, Andrew
• 185-87 Credible Coalitions and the Core
  by Ray, Debraj
• 189-94 Existence of Stationary Equilibrium Strategies in Non-zero Sum Discounted Stochastic Games with Uncountable State Space and State-Independent Transitions
  by Parthasarathy, T & Sinha, S
• 195-207 Regular Simple Games
  by Einy, Ezra & Lehrer, Ehud
• 209-26 Information Market Games
  by Muto, Shigeo & Potters, Jos & Tijs, Stef
• 227-40 A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation
  by Winter, Eyal

• 1-29 On Stochastic Games with Lack of Information on One Side
  by Melolidakis, C
• 31-36 Reduction of Silverman-Like Games to Games on Bounded Sets
  by Heuer, G A
• 37-44 A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games
  by Bolger, E M
• 45-55 On Repeated Games without a Recursive Structure: Existence of Lim Vn
  by Sorin, S
• 57-89 Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions
  by Lehrer, E
• 91-110 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for l-Stability of Games in Constitutional Form
  by Andjiga, N G & Moulen, J
• 111-17 A Note on Balancedness and Nonemptiness of the Core in Voting Games
  by Le Breton, M

• 245-78 Games with Informants: An Information-Theoretical Approach towards a Game-Theoretical Problem
  by Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
• 279-300 Bargaining in Cooperative Games
  by Bennett, Elaine & Zame, William R
• 301-10 Values and Semivalues on Subspaces of Finite Games
  by Monderer, Dov
• 311-14 A Note on the von Neumann-Morgenstern Solution [Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures]
  by Chang, Chih

• 165-75 Nim Games with Arbitrary Periodic Moving Orders
  by Althofer, Ingo
• 177-86 A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games
  by Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William
• 187-91 A Note on Tight Extensive Game Forms
  by Kolpin, Van W
• 193-200 A Note on Aspirations in Non-transferable Utility Games
  by Bomze, Immanuel M
• 201-04 Games with Convex Payoff Function in the First Variable
  by Gomez, E
• 205-24 Refinements of the B-Core and the Strong Equilibrium and the Aumann Proposition
  by Chakrabarti, Subir K
• 225-39 Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination
  by Okada, A

• 89-99 An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value
  by Lehrer, E
• 101-27 The Manipulability of the Shapley-Value
  by Thomson, William
• 129-34 Deception Games
  by Baston, V J & Bostock, F A
• 135-64 Neutral Veto Correspondences with a Continuum of Alternatives
  by Abdou, J

• 1-65 The Shapley Value in the Non Differentiable Case
  by Mertens, J F
• 67-87 The Linearizing Projection, Global Theories
  by Ruckle, W H

• 245-52 Individual and Collective Opportunities
  by Thomson, W
• 253-61 Discrete Hamstrung Squad Car Games
  by Baston, V J D & Bostock, F A
• 263-89 Sub-core Solutions of the Problem of Strong Implementation
  by Holzman, R
• 290 On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse: A Correction
  by Peleg, B
• 291-320 Single-Suit Two-Person Card Play
  by Kahn, J & Lagarias, J C & Witsenhausen, H S
• 321-25 Achievement and Avoidance Games for Generating Abelian Groups
  by Anderson, M & Harary, F

• 133-54 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria
  by Myerson, R B
• 155-62 Existence of Solutions of Games with Some Non-convexity
  by McClendon, J F
• 163-74 Stable Extensive Game Forms with Perfect Information
  by Ichiishi, Tatsuro
• 175-86 Power Indices for Multicandidate Voting Games
  by Bolger, E M
• 187-200 On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse
  by Peleg, B

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