A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games
AbstractJordan  defined âpillage gamesâ, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a âpower functionâ satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We use graph theory to reinterpret this result, tightening the bound, highlighting the role played by resource monotonicity, and suggesting a strategy for yet tighter bounds.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 40 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2009. "A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 09-01r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jordan, J.S., 2006. "Pillage and property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 26-44, November.
- Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2009. "Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 09-07, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Beardon, Alan F. & Rowat, Colin, 2013. "Efficient sets are small," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 367-374.
- Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2012. "Sufficient Conditions for the Unique Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 12-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
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